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SECTION RECOMMENDATIONS
AND REPORTS

American and Canadian Bar
Associations
Joint Working Group on the
Settlement of International Disputes
I. Settlement of Disputes under the
Proposed Free Trade Area
Agreement
I. RESOLUTION
The Joint Working Group of the American and Canadian Bar Associations (hereafter "Joint Working Group") recommends that the American
and Canadian Bar Associations adopt the following Recommendation and
Report:*
RECOMMENDATION

BE IT RESOLVED that (the American Bar Association) (the Canadian
Bar Association) recommends the adoption by the Governments of Canada and the United States, in connection with their free trade agreement,
of appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms in relation to trade disputes
involving their respective countries, and, in particular, the establishment
of:

*The recommendation proposed by the Joint Committee was approved by the Legislation
and Law Reform Committee of the Canadian Bar Association on May 14, 1987. and by the
Governing Board of the American Bar Association on June 5, 1987 (with the standard
disclaimer that the report is not policy of the Association but is submitted as a possible
basis for a free trade agreement between the two countries).
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(a) A Joint Canada-United States Free Trade Commission to assist the
two countries in the management of trade disputes between them by
organizing special studies and consultations and helping to establish and
choose appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms;
(b) A Joint Canada-United States Free Trade Tribunal to interpret the
free trade agreement and to decide legal disputes between them relating
to their rights and obligations under the agreement; and
(c) Appropriate procedures enabling reference to the above-mentioned
Tribunal from domestic courts and administrative bodies of either country
of questions involving the interpretation of the free trade agreement, at
the instance of affected parties, including private parties.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that (the American Bar Association)
(the Canadian Bar Association) authorizes the Joint Working Group of
the International Law Sections of the American and Canadian Bar Associations to submit to the government officials of both countries in charge
of the free trade negotiations suitable comments and explanations, consistent with the foregoing principles.

i. REPORT
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Report is to present to the American and Canadian
Bar Associations certain guiding principles and proposals concerning the
mechanisms for the settlement of disputes arising out of the interpretation,
application or operation of a free trade agreement between Canada and
the United States. These proposals are consistent with, and constitute a
supplement to, the two draft treaties on the settlement of disputes between
the two countries that were proposed by the Joint Working Group and
were approved unanimously by the governing bodies of both Associations
in 1979. The new proposals are broader, as they envisage a wider range
of necessary or useful procedures and institutions and narrower, as they
are limited to the area of trade disputes. In some cases, basic principles
contained in the 1979 resolutions have been changed to adapt them to the
requirements of this specific subject matter.
The two main assumptions of the present Report are based on those
of the 1979 one: In the first place, the legal systems of the two countries
are similar, emphasizing the rule of law and the importance of settlement
of disputes by impartial tribunals. Once the rules are codified in the free
trade agreement, there should be an institution to interpret that agreement
in an impartial fashion. Secondly, it is desirable to solve most disputes
originating in private claims through giving private parties recourse to
VOL. 22. NO. 3
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domestic and international institutions, without having to get the two
Governments involved directly in every dispute.
In addition, this Report takes into account recent developments in the
theory and practice of conflict resolution, and suggests various methods
of more effective dispute management, joint and cooperative. Such management requires the availability of alternative means of bringing the parties together and helping them in finding an equitable solution.
Two principal common institutions are proposed in this Report:
(a) a Joint Canada-United States Free Trade Commission (hereafter
"Commission"), which would monitor the trade relations between the
two countries, warning about undesirable developments and trends, organizing special studies and consultations, and directing each arising issue
into the channel most appropriate for its resolution (such as fact-finding,
mediation, conciliation, or arbitration by a special tribunal),
(b) a special Joint Canada-United States Free Trade Tribunal (hereafter
"Tribunal") which would consider legal issues relating to the interpretation, application or operation of the free trade agreement, and decide
legal disputes arising under that agreement that may be submitted to it
directly by the two Governments or by reference from national courts or
administrative tribunals or agencies, at the instance of the other parties
or the Commission.
The various parts of this Report deal, respectively, with the 1979 report,
issues connected with the proposed free trade agreement that may give
rise to disputes, general guidelines for the settlement of trade disputes,
dispute management, arbitration, and access of private persons to dispute
settlement procedures. Illustrative drafts of treaty texts on dispute settlement that may be appropriate for the special trade relationship between
Canada and the United States are presented in an appendix. If desired,
the Working Group would prepare additional appendices, providing further details respecting the structure and functions of various proposed
institutions and the procedures that might be utilized.
A. Summary of the 1979 Report
The settlement of disputes between Canada and the United States was studied
by the Joint Working Group in the 1970's, and its report to the American and
Canadian Bar Associations noted the existence of a variety of disputes on economic, trade and investment questions, such as import, export and investment
restrictions, energy resources, antitrust and extraterritorialjurisdiction problems,
and pollution of boundary waters and of the air. I
I. American Bar Association and Canadian Bar Association, Settlement of International
Disputes Between Canada and the United States of America: Resolutions adopted by the
American Bar Association on August 15, 1979 and the Canadian Bar Association on August
30, 1979 with Accompanying Reports and Recommendations I1-113 (1979).
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In 1979, the two Bar Associations approved two draft treaties, prepared
by the Joint Working Group, one providing for equal access to and equality
of remedies available in the courts of the two countries in transfrontier
pollution cases and the other providing general procedures for third-party
settlement of disputes. 2 The first one was implemented to some extent
by another Joint Working Group, established by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada and the United States National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which prepared a Draft Transfrontier
Pollution Reciprocal Access Act. 3 This uniform law was approved by the
Uniform Law Commissioners of the two countries in August 1982, and
is now in force in the Canadian Provinces of Ontario, Manitoba and Prince
Edward Island and the States of Colorado, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey and Wisconsin. The second draft treaty contained a proposal to confer
compulsory jurisdiction on an arbitral tribunal or a special chamber of
the International Court of Justice over any question of interpretation,
application or operation of a treaty in force between the two countries.
It also provided for optional jurisdiction over eight specified categories
of disputes; for instance, those relating to pecuniary claims of nationals
of one country against the other country, immunities of States and of their
agencies and subdivisions, environmental issues, the management of natural resources of common interest, or transnational application of civil
and criminal laws. Acceptance ofjurisdiction over any one of the specified
categories was to be made by supplementary agreements through an exchange of notes between the two Governments without need for further
4
legislative action.
Since 1979, the Joint Working Group was able to bring together the
legal advisers of the United States Department of State and the Canadian
Department of External Affairs to discuss the possibility of the two Governments' approval of such a treaty and to dispel some objections to such
a treaty. Nevertheless, despite the resolution of the dispute relating to
the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area by
a decision of a chamber of the International Court of Justice, 5 no serious
negotiations have been started on a more comprehensive agreement for
the settlement of various disputes between the two countries.
The only general agreements in force between the two countries on the
settlement of international disputes are the 1899 Hague Convention on
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes that contains general provisions on good offices, mediation, international commissions of inquiry
2. Id., at xiii-xxxii (in English and French).
3. Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act, Drafted, Approved and
Recommended for Enactment by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and Uniform Law Conference of Canada (Uniform Law Commissioners, 1982).
4. See, op. cit. supra note 1, at xxi.
5. 1984 I.C.J. 246.
VOL. 22, NO. 3

SECTION RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS

883

and arbitration, 6 and the 1914 Treaty for the Advancement of Peace between the United Kingdom and the United States that provides for a
conciliation commission of five members. (This treaty was amended in
1941 to provide for the direct appointment by Canada of its members of
the commission.) 7 Both these documents require a special agreement by
both parties on the submission of a particular dispute to a third-party
settlement. A 1908 general arbitration convention between the United
Kingdom and the United States that was then applicable also to Canada,
not only required a special agreement in each case, but also excluded all
disputes that affect the vital interests, the independence or the honor of
the two parties or that concern the interests of third parties. 8 This convention expired in 1928, when the two parties were preoccupied with the
negotiations relating to the Briand-Kellogg Pact for the Renunciation of
9
War.
Both Canada and the United States are also bound by a number of
multilateral treaties that provide for the judicial settlement or arbitration
with respect to disputes relating to the interpretation or application of
these treaties. 10 There are a few bilateral treaties that provide for the
settlement of disputes between the two countries that relate to the interpretation or application of these treaties. IIAlthough there are more than
200 such treaties, multilateral or bilateral, between the two countries,
covering subjects ranging from aeronautical research to zoology, and although their number and variety increase from year to year, only a few
of them contain dispute settlement clauses.
The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty established a permanent International Joint Commission to deal with applications for the use, obstruction
6. For text of the 1899 Hague Convention, see 32 Stat. 1779, U.S. Treaty Series No.
392, I Bevans 230. While the United States is a party to both the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions, Canada is a party only to the 1899 one. For a recent review of twenty CanadaUnited States arbitrations, see Wang, "Adjudication of Canada-United States Disputes,"
1981 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 158-228.
7. For the original text of the United Kingdom-United States Treaty for the Advancement
of Peace, see 12 Bevans 370, 108 Br. & For. S. Papers 384; for the amended text see 6
Bevans 190, 1941 Can. T.S. 9.
8. For the text of the 1908 arbitration treaty, see 12 Bevans 295, 101 Br. & For. S. Papers
208.
9. See 4 Documents on Can. For. Rel. 568-70, 573-74, 584-86.
10. Among these treaties are: The 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation, 61
Stat. 1180, TIAS No. 1591, 3 Bevans 944, 15 UNTS 295; the 1919 Constitution of the
International Labor Organization, as amended in 1946, 62 Stat. 3485, TIAS No. 1868, 4
Bevans 188, 15 UNTS 35; 1953 Convention on the political Rights of Women, 27 UST 1909,
TIAS No. 8289, 193 UNTS 133; the 1961 Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 23 UST 3227,
TIAS No. 7502, 500 UNTS 95; the 1973 International Telecommunication Convention, 28
UST 2495, TIAS No. 8572.
I1.See, for instance, the 1924 Convention for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating
Liquors, 43 Stat. 1761, U.S. Treaty Series No. 685, 12 Bevans 414, 17 LNTS 182 (the I'm
Alone Case was submitted to a Joint Commission under this convention); the 1977 Agreement
Concerning Transit Pipelines, 28 UST 7449, TIAS No. 8720.
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or diversion of boundary waters. That Commission was also charged with
making reports and recommendations with respect to differences between
the two countries, involving their rights or those of their inhabitants along
the boundary, that were referred to the Commission jointly by the two
Governments. 12 Over the years, the Commission has considered more
than two hundred applications and references, and its recommendations,
based on careful technical studies and consultations with all the interested
parties, have usually been accepted by the two Governments. 13 In recent
years, the Commission has been asked by the two countries for recommendations concerning not only water levels and use but also water and
air pollution. 14 However, no cases were submitted to the Commission for
"decision" under Article 10 of the treaty. Submission under that provision
depended on a special agreement of both countries requiring, as far as
the United States is concerned, prior advice and consent of the Senate. 15
B. International Trade Issues
The Governments of Canada and the United States agreed in 1985 to
begin negotiations on a bilateral free trade treaty. In response, the American and Canadian Bar Associations established a new Joint Committee
on Trade and Investment to study the legal issues involved in such a
treaty in cooperation with the present Joint Working Group. Most of the
free trade issues to be studied relate to the substance of the treaty, both
as to scope and content. They involve in particular the rules that should
govern the relations between the two countries not only with respect to
trade and investment in the strict sense, but also with respect to such
closely related issues as antitrust laws, intellectual property protection,
patent rights and those regulatory systems and administrative practices
which significantly affect bilateral trade and investment. Other issues
relate to finding appropriate ways and means for preventing disputes that
may arise under the new trade agreement and for resolving them if they
cannot be prevented. The dispute disposition process contains ordinarily
two parts:
First, developing adequate solutions for existing disputes through a basic
agreement on the rules of international law that should govern various aspects

12. For the text of the Boundary Waters Treaty, see 12 Bevans 319, 102 Br. & For. S.
BLOOMFIELD and FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATERS PROBLEMS OF

Papers 137; see also

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

(Toronto, 1958); M. Cohen, "The Regime of Boundary

Waters: The Canadian-United States Experience," 146 Hague Academy, Recueil des Cours
219-340 (1975.111).
13. See 3 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 813-871 (1964).
14. See, e.g., 3 id. 789, 828, 853, 855, 869.
15. See 3 id. 816.
VOL. 22, NO. 3

SECTION RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS

885

of international trade and investment and embodying these rules in the trade
agreement or annexes thereto, and providing a process for easy adaptation of
the agreement or its annexes to the rapidly changing circumstances of international economic relations; and
Second, providing various means for resolving disputes relating to the interpretation, application or operation of the trade agreement.

The mission of the new Joint Committee on Trade and Investment is
to study the whole range of substantive issues involved in the first set of
questions. By contrast, the Joint Working Group intends to deal, through
this Report, only with the second set of questions. The Joint Working
Group will explore herein the applicable principles and the various options
that are available for the settlement of such disputes. It will use as precedents dispute settlement provisions included in various international
agreements dealing with similar situations.
C. Guiding Principles
The following principles should serve as useful guidelines to the Canadian and United States negotiators in arriving at the dispute settlement
provisions of the free trade agreement:
Principle 1
Any free trade agreement between Canada and the United States must
include an effective dispute settlement system designed specifically for a
free trade area.
A free trade agreement of the type contemplated in the current negotiations between Canada and the United States should contain provisions
for the resolution of three classes of disputes. These are disputes: (a)
between the two countries; (b) between one of these countries and a
national of the other country; and (c) between nationals of one of the two
countries and a national of the other. It is in the interest of all to resolve
such disputes expeditiously.
This dispute settlement system has to be specifically designed for its
task of dealing with Canada-United States trade issues. The conflict resolution provisions contained in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") have proven largely ineffective when applied to relations
between Canada and the United States. Those provisions were drafted
not for this specific situation, but for a wide range of disputes among
many disparate nations.
It would be desirable, therefore, to include in the Canada-United States
free trade agreement an express provision that, except when the two
governments so agree, they shall not avail themselves of the GATT provisions for the settlement of disputes, but will resolve all disputes relating
to the interpretation, application or operation of the free trade agreement
by the system of dispute settlement specified in that agreement.
FALL 1988
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Principle 2
Such a system for dispute settlement should consist of a variety of dispute
settlement means and techniques.
The system for dispute settlement should contain a full scale of techniques ranging from simple governmental or private party negotiations
through mandatory third-party dispute settlement procedures. The system
would have to deal with various stages of the differences that arise in a
long-term relationship. The system would cover the gamut of means of
dispute disposition, including dispute avoidance, dispute management,
dispute settlement and post-dispute monitoring and evaluation. It is obvious that each stage in the relationship between the two countries would
require different kinds of means and techniques. Moreover, it is apparent
that a particular dispute might call for not merely one, but possibly several,
sequential means depending on the nature, subject and context of the
particular dispute.
Principle 3
The system should facilitate the presentation to the two Governments of
recommendations with respect to each subject matter or stage of a dispute,
suggesting the means or techniques to be used to solve the problems.
However, the parties, by agreement, should be able to substitute other
means if they feel that they would be more likely to reach a solution
thereby.
A dispute often is complicated by the superimposition of a further
dispute as to the appropriate procedure for the resolution of a particular
dispute. To prevent this, the dispute settlement system should include a
"traffic director" that would determine what dispute settlement method
should be used by the parties, taking into account any guidelines on the
subject that may be included in the agreement. However, since the parties
themselves have the best sense of the most appropriate procedure for
achieving a solution, they should make the ultimate decision as to the
means by which the dispute should be settled. If, within a specified period,
the parties have not agreed on a method, it would be necessary for the
traffic directing entity to make specific recommendations on the subject.
If one of the parties should reject the recommendations, the other party
would be entitled to resort unilaterally to another means (for instance, a
meeting of trade ministers) that the free trade agreement might authorize
to deal with such a situation.
Principle 4
The dispute settlement system should encourage the resolution of disputes
by existing domestic means of dispute settlement rather than by countryto-country procedures. Any natural or legal person who is a national of
one of the two countries should be granted equal access to the courts and
administrative agencies of the other country in any case involving an
VOL. 22, NO. 3
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interpretation,application or operation of the free trade agreement that
might seriously affect that person's significant interests.
Dispute resolution should become routine and expeditious. Recourse
to domestic courts and administrative agencies should be the preferred
mode of dispute resolution. To the extent that there exist obstacles to the
participation of foreign nationals in domestic judicial or administrative
proceedings, they should be promptly removed. Canadian or United States
nationals should be granted access equal to that of nationals of the other
country in cases relating to the free trade agreement whenever their significant interests are involved.
The cost and political damage often connected with a country-tocountry resolution of even routine disputes would be avoided, wherever
possible, by interpersonal resolution. This is consistent with the approach
adopted by the uniform laws that followed the proposal presented by the
present Joint Working Group in 1979 in relation to transfrontier boundary
pollution;16 it rests on essentially similar legal and administrative
considerations.
Principle 5
A. When the rights of one of the two countries under the free trade
agreement are involved, provision should be made for resolving the dispute by utilizing country-to-country procedures. A country should be able
to participatein the case of one of its nationalswho is utilizing the normal
means of dispute settlement in the other country, as provided for by
Principle 4, when the country considers that its significant interests may
be seriously affected. Even if a person's rights are finally disposed of in
proceedings conducted in accordance with Principle 4, either country
should be able to refer the matter to a country-to-country procedure for
a review of the principles involved.
Fundamental and sovereign rights of one country should not be totally
subject to determination in the courts or administrative agencies of the
other country, but should be resolved by country-to-country procedures.
Either country should be able to have such matters determined through
procedures which will safeguard its rights under the agreement or customary international law; it should be able to resort to a forum in which
it will not subject itself to the sovereignty of the other state, such as, for
instance, the Joint Tribunal.
A country may find it necessary, however, to participate in a case in
another country if its own significant interests appear likely to be seriously
affected by a decision in that case. It should be allowed to intervene, or
at least to present an amicus curiae brief, in an ongoing case in the other
country. If the dispute presents questions of interpretation of the free
16. See supra note 3 and the accompanying text.
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trade agreement, either country should be entitled to propose that such
questions be referred to the Joint Tribunal or another special joint institution for advice. (See Principle 6).
Principle 6
The dispute settlement system should establish a procedure by which

questions of law respecting the free trade agreement or matters of international law affecting that agreement could be referred by either state
from state courts to a tribunal constitutedjointly by them. Both states
should also authorize by domestic legislation a reference to the Joint
Tribunal by a domestic court or agency, whenever a question of interpretation of the free trade agreement should arise in such court or agency.

A similar principle has been utilized within the European Economic
Community and has been successful in harmonizing the conduct of domestic courts with that of the Community institutions in applying the
fundamental Community treaty and international law. 17 Such a procedure
could play a very valuable role in the coordination and harmonization of
the domestic laws of the two countries respecting the agreement. The free
trade agreement or an annex thereto should describe in some detail the
exact relationship between the suggested international institution and procedure and domestic courts or agencies and specify the character of the
decisions of the Joint Tribunal or other institution to which a reference
has been made.
D. Dispute Management
The 1979 Report of the Joint Working Group 18 was not limited to dispute
settlement. In Part II, it dealt with the practice of Canada and the United
States in the three main stages of various disputes between them: dispute
avoidance (pp. 19-23), dispute management (pp. 23-30), and dispute settlement or resolution (pp. 30-38). It noted the importance of various
mixed commissions, and especially of the International Joint Commission
on boundary waters ("I.J.C."), in managing a variety of disputes of both
intergovernmental and non-governmental origin. The history of these disputes shows that there is a special need for a "traffic director," an institution that would have the limited role of determining (as noted above in
Principle 3) what would be the most suitable procedure for dealing with
a particular dispute. While the role of the I.J.C. was largely confined to
problems relating to boundary waters, other matters, especially those
17. See European Economic Community Treaty, Article 177. For the text of that treaty,
see 298 UNTS 11. See also T. C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW

247-82 (1981);

E.

STEIN,
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18. See supra note 1.
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involving transboundary pollution, have been referred to it from time to
time. 19

Based on seventy years of the experience of the I.J.C. and on precedents
established in other free trade areas, 20 the Joint Working Group offers
the following suggestions as appropriate for the settlement of trade disputes:
1. A Joint Canada-United States Free Trade Commission (hereafter "Commission") should be established. It should be composed of an equal number of
members from each country.
2. The members of the Commission should be persons held in high regard
in both countries and should have appropriate background and expertise in
trade matters. The Commission's members should represent the disciplines and
professions needed to deal with various areas covered by the free trade agreement. They should serve full time, in view of the likely large volume of issues
to be considered. They should hold office for non-renewable five-year terms.
The legislation of each country should provide for security of tenure and adequate pay and benefits.
3. The Joint Commission should adopt its own rules of procedure and those
of its subsidiary agencies or entities. The chairperson should serve a term of
no more than five years and then be succeeded by a chairperson who is a
national of the other country. They should alternate similarly thereafter.
4. The Commission should have a joint secretariat that would enable the
Commission to play a cooperative, creative and positive role.
5. Matters could be brought before the Commission: (a) by joint reference
by the two Governments; (b) by either of the two Governments; or (c) upon
the Commission's own initiative, or on the basis of a petition by a private party,
provided neither Government objects.
6. The Commission would monitor emergent disputes, and would bring them
to the attention of the two Governments as early as possible, and would ask
them at that time whether they wish to deal with the dispute directly through
diplomatic negotiations or consultations, or whether they would like the Commission to consider what steps should be taken to prevent the deterioration of
the situation.
7. If either Government so requests, the Commission should make recommendations to the two Governments as to the manner in which a dispute should
be managed. The Commission may propose to the two Governments the elucidation of the facts, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.
8. If elucidation of the facts is required, the Commission may propose to
conduct an investigation or suggest the establishment of a joint fact-finding
group of experts. The findings would be independent of any control of the
Commission, but the Commission would be entitled to present to the two Governments its comments and recommendations respecting such findings.
9. The Joint Commission may establish a roster of experts acceptable to both
Governments from which persons might be chosen jointly by the two Governments, or by the Commission when so authorized by the two Governments, to
serve as mediators or conciliators. Once a dispute arises, the Commission may
ask the two Governments to authorize it to select from that roster a mediator,
19. See supra notes 12-15 and the accompanying text.
20. See, e.g.. the 1985 Israel-United States Free Trade Area Agreement, Article 19(l)(d)(f). For text of that agreement, see 24

INT'L LEG. MATERIALS

653 (1985).
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or a conciliation commission, whenever the Commission should consider that
mediation or conciliation would constitute the most appropriate method for
achieving a settlement. The Governments may agree that the Commission itself
or one or more of its members should act as mediators or conciliators in a
particular dispute or category of disputes.
10. The Commission shall also be authorized to establish other subsidiary
agencies, or other entities that may prove necessary for the proper exercise of
its functions.
11. The Commission, or any one of its subsidiary entities, in addition to
assisting in settling a dispute, may be authorized by the two Governments to
suggest long-range solutions that would diminish the chance of recurrence of a
particular dispute or category of disputes.
12. The members of the Commission, and its staff, should be granted such
immunities as might be necessary for the independent exercise of their functions,
including the immunity for their official acts. The employees should be considered as employees of the Commission rather than of the respective Governments, and should act accordingly.

E. Joint Tribunal
The 1979 Report provided for the establishment, whenever necessary,
of an arbitral tribunal, and for a reference to a chamber of the International
Court of Justice, if the tribunal cannot be established. As it is not likely
that Canada and the United States would be able to arrange for a chamber
of the Court able to deal with a large number of trade disputes on a
continuous basis, a different arrangement will be necessary for assuring
a method for the resolution of disputes under the free trade agreement.
The alternative methods of dispute resolution discussed in the previous
section of this Report are likely to resolve most of the disputes arising
under the agreement, but past experience shows that a hard core of disputes will still require reference to an impartial tribunal for final decision.
The tremendous effort being made to codify the rules that will govern the
free trade area will be nullified, if there should be no means to resolve
finally the disputes relating to the interpretation of these rules. The Joint
Working Group agreed, therefore, to propose the establishment of a Joint
Canada-United States Free Trade Tribunal with jurisdiction to interpret
the agreement and to decide disputes arising thereunder. This jurisdiction
should extend not only to disputes between the two Governments but
also to disputes relating to the interpretation of the agreement arising in
domestic tribunals or agencies.
The Joint Working Group is conscious of the fact that the establishment
of such a tribunal would require overcoming some serious difficulties on
both sides of the border. In the United States, there is the traditional
reluctance of the Senate to agree in advance to arbitration of a broad
category of disputes, and its insistence that in each case an agreement to
submit a particular dispute to a tribunal requires its advice and consent.
VOL. 22, NO. 3
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In Canada also there are difficult questions about the participation of
Provinces in issues involving international trade and in the settlement of
disputes relating thereto. In 1979, similar problems with respect to transfrontier pollution disputes were solved to some extent by using the device
of uniform laws (as noted in Section A above). The Joint Working Group
believes that once all institutions and persons concerned realize that a
free trade agreement requires for its effectiveness a special tribunal, a
way will be found to establish it without jeopardizing the agreement as
a whole.
Once that decision is made, there is great advantage in having a permanent tribunal rather than having to go through a laborious appointment
process time after time, whenever a case is to be submitted to the tribunal.
A permanent tribunal need not have a rigid composition. It should be
large enough to allow constitution of panels of different size and membership constituted according to the character or importance of the dispute
or the parties' wishes. For example, an intergovernmental dispute might
require a five-person body while the normal panel for references from
national courts might be three. Similarly, the process of selection in the
case of reference from a domestic court might be quite different from that
in an intergovernmental dispute. Significant revisions might be required
in the provisions on the subject included in the draft treaty contained in
the 1979 Report.
Ideally, the tribunal should be composed of eminent persons having
high reputation as being both impartial and familiar with international
trade problems. It can be hoped that a sufficient number of them may be
found amongjudges, lawyers and law professors in Canada and the United
States. It is likely, however, that the two Governments would want to
have on the tribunal also legal experts from other countries. The Joint
Commission may be authorized to prepare a roster of such persons, competent in various areas of trade, who would be acceptable to both Governments, and the President of the Joint Tribunal would select persons
from that roster, after consultations with the parties, taking into account
the special characteristics of each case.
The decisions of the Joint Tribunal would be binding on both countries,
and each country would have to arrange for such measures as may be
necessary to ensure compliance with the decision.
In some cases both Governments or one of them may request the Joint
Tribunal not for a decision whether a violation of the free trade agreement
has occurred, but for a declaratory judgment, or even an advisory opinion,
elucidating a provision of the agreement or a rule of international law
relevant to the interpretation or application of the agreement.
Rules of procedure of the Joint Tribunal would have to be adapted to
the special needs of a free trade area. The proceedings should be as
FALL 1988
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expeditious as possible, without depriving the parties of the right to be
heard. Trade disputes would often involve technical questions and various
factual issues requiring careful exploration before any law can be applied.
The experience of the Court of Justice of the European Communities
would be helpful in this regard.
F. Access of Private Persons to Dispute Settlement Procedures
As noted in Guiding Principles 4, 5 and 6, it would be desirable to
include in the part of the free trade agreement dealing with the settlement
of disputes appropriate arrangements for access by private persons, both
natural and legal. Any person whose duties, rights or interests might be
seriously affected by a court proceeding or administrative action relating
to the application of the agreement should be able to have any issue of
interpretation of the agreement that arises in such proceeding or action
referred to the Joint Canada-United States Free Trade Tribunal for advice.
Such arrangements need to be accompanied and implemented by domestic legislation that would allow a person who is a national of one of
the two countries to the free trade agreement to invoke that agreement
directly before a court or administrative tribunal or agency of the other
country. Appropriate provisions would have to be inserted in codes of
judicial and administrative procedure of the two countries to permit a
reference of such an interpretation question to the Joint Tribunal. 2 1 In
particular, when a court or administrative tribunal in the United States
or Canada is considering a case requiring an interpretation of a provision
of the agreement, the court or tribunal itself should be able to refer the
issue of interpretation to the Joint Tribunal. Similarly, a party to the
dispute should be entitled to request that this question of interpretation
be referred to the Joint Tribunal for the sole purpose of obtaining the
advice of that Tribunal on the proper interpretation of the agreement. If
a domestic court or administrative tribunal should thus refer a question
to the Joint Tribunal, proceedings in the domestic court or tribunal should
be suspended, pending the advisory ruling of the Joint Tribunal. After
this advice had been given, the domestic court or tribunal would resume
the proceedings and would apply the interpretation thus given to the facts
of the case before it.
The procedure might be slightly different if an administrative agency
of the United States or Canada should start a proceeding leading to an
21. For an example of similar rules, namely the United Kingdom rules relating to references for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Communities, see
United Kingdom, Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 114, reprinted in 17 Atkin's Encyclopaedia of Court Forms in Civil Proceedings 213 (2d ed., 1975). These rules relate to the
High Court and Court of Appeals; there are separate rules for other courts, ibid., at 214-19.
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action that an affected person considers contrary to the agreement and
injurious to that person's interests, rights or duties. If the agency concerned should agree that its action might seriously affect that person, it
would follow the same procedure as a court or administrative tribunal
and would refer the question of interpretation of the agreement to the
Joint Tribunal. Should the agency reject the request for obtaining the
advice of the Joint Tribunal, the party concerned should be entitled to
refer the matter to an appropriate domestic court or administrative tribunal. That court or tribunal, if it should find the request prima facie
justified, would issue a preliminary order requesting the administrative
agency to suspend its proceeding pending the receipt of the advice from
the Joint Tribunal, and would formulate the question or questions relating
to the interpretation of the agreement that should be referred to that
Tribunal. As soon as the Joint Tribunal gives its interpretation of the
agreement, the domestic court or administrative tribunal would refer the
Tribunal's interpretation to the agency concerned, would authorize it to
resume the proceeding, and request it to take the Tribunal's interpretation
into account in deciding what action should be taken.
The party to the original proceeding that has requested the reference,
any other party to the proceeding, and any agency concerned, would all
be entitled to participate in the proceeding before the Joint Tribunal,
whether written or oral, to the extent found necessary by the Tribunal.
Each of the two Governments would be entitled to present to the Tribunal
an amicus curiae brief on the issue of interpretation of the agreement.
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Appendix
Illustrative Drafts of Certain Clauses
Pertaining to Dispute Resolution
1. Among the options available for dispute settlement provisions of a
free trade agreement are various types of provisions relating to a Joint
Commission, advance notification, consultation, conciliation and arbitration. To illustrate some of these options, a few examples of such provisions
adapted from the existing agreements 22 are provided in this section.
2. Annexes I-IV will be prepared as soon as the text of the basic articles
is agreed upon.
ARTICLE I. CANADA-UNITED STATES JOINT COMMISSION
I. The Parties agree to establish a Joint Commission (a) to keep under
review the implementation of the Agreement; (b) identify potential disputes that may arise with respect to the interpretation, application, or
operation of the Agreement, and call the important ones to the attention
of the Parties; and (c) to carry such other functions as the Parties confer
upon it.
2. [The composition, functions and the modus operandi of the Joint
Commission are described in Section D of this Report.]
3. The Joint Commission will make arrangements, in particular, for the
consultations under Articles II and III, mediation under Article IV, and
conciliation under Article V. It may also advise the Parties respecting the
submission of the particular dispute or specified questions to an arbitration
tribunal or to the Joint Canada-United States Free Trade Tribunal.

22. These drafts take into account the following free trade area agreements: IrelandUnited Kingdom, 1965 Agreement Establishing a Free Trade Area, Article 23, 565 UNTS
78; New Zealand-Australia, 1983 Closer Economic Relations [and] Trade Agreement, Article
22, 22 Int'l Leg. Materials 945 (1983); and Israel-United States, 1985 Free Trade Area
Agreement, Articles 17-19, 24 Int'l Leg. Materials 653 (1985). There were similar provisions
also in Canada-United States, 1935 Reciprocal Trade Agreement, Article It, 49 Stat. 3960;
Exec. Agre. No. 91, 6 Bevans 75.
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ARTICLE II. ADVANCE NOTIFICATION AND CONSULTATION
1. Before either Party to the Agreement commits itself to a free trade
area, customs union, or reduction by reciprocal agreement or unilaterally,
of trade or service barriers, with respect to a third party, it shall notify
the other Party and the Joint Commission in writing as far in advance as
practicable.
2. Before either Party takes any other measure that may affect seriously
the products traded or services provided between them, it shall notify the
other Party and the Joint Commission in writing as far in advance as may
be practicable. The notice shall include a description of the circumstances
leading to the proposed action, the reasons for its urgency, and the likely
impact on the trade and services between the Parties.
3. If either Party considers that it may be seriously affected by any of
the measures referred to in paragraphs I or 2, it shall request consultations
with a view to arriving at an equitable and mutually satisfactory solution;
and the Party planning to take the measure shall promptly afford an
adequate opportunity for such consultations. The Joint Commission may
be requested by the Parties to assist in these consultations.

ARTICLE III. CONSULTATIONS CONCERNING ACTIONS
ENDANGERING THE BALANCE OF THE AGREEMENT
At the request of either Party, the Parties shall, or at the suggestion of
the Joint Commission they may, enter into consultations, either directly
or through the Joint Commission, with a view to achieving an equitable
and mutually satisfactory solution preserving the balance of this Agreement, if the Party which requested the consultations considers that:
(a) an obligation under this Agreement has not been or is not being
fulfilled;
(b) a benefit conferred upon it by this Agreement is being denied;
(c) the achievement of any objective of this Agreement is being or may
be frustrated;
(d) any cases of special difficulty have arisen or may arise; or
(e) a measure taken by the other party severely distorts the balance of
trade or service benefits accorded by this Agreement or substantially
undermines fundamental objectives of this Agreement; or
(f) a change of circumstances necessitates or may necessitate a variation
in the terms of the Agreement.
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ARTICLE IV. PARTICIPATION OF MEDIATOR
Either Party may request the other Party that a mediator be asked to
take part in consultations provided for in Articles II and III; and the other
Party shall promptly enter into consultations for the appointment of such
mediator. If no agreement is reached on the appointment of such mediator
within a period of 21 days, the Parties may ask the Joint Commission to
act as a mediator or to appoint a suitable mediator. In such a case, the
consultations referred to in Articles I1 and III shall start as soon as the
mediator has been appointed.
ARTICLE V. CONCILIATION
I. Whenever the consultations referred to in Articles II and III do not
result in a mutually satisfactory solution within a period of sixty days
after their commencement, or within such longer period as the Parties
may agree upon, either Party may request the Joint Commission to refer
the matter to conciliation.
2. In addition, whenever a dispute arises concerning the interpretation,
application or operation of this Agreement, either Party may request that
the matter be referred to conciliation.
3. Unless the Parties agree otherwise, the conciliation shall be conducted in accordance with the procedure specified in Annex II to this
Agreement.
4. If the resort to conciliation does not lead to an agreement within
sixty days after the conciliation procedure has commenced, the conciliator
shall present to the Parties within thirty days thereafter a report containing
the findings with respect to issues submitted by the Parties, and proposals
for an equitable solution preserving the balance of the Agreement.
5. The proposals and reports arising out of a conciliation shall not be
binding on the Parties, either with respect to the statement of facts or in
regard to questions of law, and they shall have no other character than
that of recommendations submitted to the Parties.
ARTICLE VI. JOINT TRIBUNAL
1. Any dispute relating to the interpretation, application or operation
of this Agreement, which has not been settled within a reasonable time
by direct negotiations, shall be submitted to the Joint Canada-United
States Free Trade Tribunal to be established in accordance with Annex
III to this Agreement.
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